The Seoul Gyopo Guide Thanks Everyone for Their Support
First, a huge "thank you" to the readers around the world.  In three short months, many thousands of visitors from every continent, and over 60 countries around the world have visited the Seoul Gyopo Guide.  The Lost Seoul has tried to share its perspective from both a foreigner's and a Korean's point of view.  These points of view have been established by many years of education and practical experience.  The bottom line is that people around the world don't know much about South Korea, and are totally unaware that a city like Seoul has grown into the world's 5th largest metropolis.  While the views of The Lost Seoul are hardly unbiased, they are views which are being offered as fairly as possible.

Korea Needs to Avoid the Japanese and U.S. Example

It is a well-known fact that the National Pension Fund of Korea faces many challenges.  Investment returns have been, overall, more than acceptable.  The National Pension Fund is a well-respected investor around the world.  Nevertheless, the demographic fact is that the average age of a Korean residing in Korea is increasing.  As a result the needs of the elderly will increase through time.  There are other countries around the world where this is an issue.  The U.S. and Japan are two prime examples.  It can easily be said that one of Japan's largest problems is that the aging population is restricting economic growth, and its future indebtedness will only grow, and potentially result in a third "lost decade," when there is limited economic growth, and limited asset price growth.  In the U.S., the Social Security system is in tatters.  While much of this may be the result of the lower tax receipts as a result of a stagnant economy, the underlying fact is this:  in the past there were 8 payors into the Social Security system for every recipient of benefits, and today that number is...3.  Korea is smaller and cannot withstand these shocks.  Various attempts to increase the birth rate have failed, to put it mildly.  In 2009, Korea had the world's lowest birthrate.   Let's put aside the other problems this causes, such as no future demand for real estate, and lack of people to populate the army.  The biggest problem of this low birthrate is that personal income taxes collected by the government will inevitably decline.  That is a certainty unless tax rates increase by an amount to compensate for the loss of payors.

Tax Soju Directly, and Remit the Funds to the National Pension Fund Directly  

Soju is the national alcoholic drink of Korea.  The Seoul Gyopo Guide proposes a 200 KRW tax on every bottle of soju, and that every won is sent to the NPF directly.  A bottle of soju at 7-Eleven or GS24 costs 1,100 KRW.  That is less than USD $1.  Now, we could enter into a whole discussion about how consumer goods are strangely priced in Korea, but don't get me started (a phrase that The Lost Seoul has taught in a previous "Slang of the Day.")  Let's just stop at a couple of examples:  a bottle of Coca-Cola, or orange juice, and a bottle of water are all (or can be) more expensive than a bottle of soju.  Drinking is a well-known problem in Korea.  In fact, there is a even a weblog dedicated to displaying drunk, passed-out Koreans on the street.  A 200KRW tax can then serve two purposes.  First, it can be used to discourage excessive drinking.  Second, it can also be used to finance the impending stress on the National Pension. 

The Potential Objections No Longer Apply

This tax has been proposed in the past.  During the Korea-IMF crisis (known in Korea as IMF 시대), a similar proposal was suggested to fund South Korea's debt to the International Monetary Fund.  At that time, there were many, many makeshift food stands on the road (포장마차) where unemployed men and women would basically sell food in temporary restaurants.  Jinro, the largest soju brand in Korea at the time, went bankrupt (it has now been re-established).  There were complaints that soju was the one of the only respites from the economic turmoil in Korea.  In addition, there was the notion that men and their sons shared soju as a rite of sorts, a tradition between men and their sons which would be jeopardized as a result of this tax.  Well, times have changed, and the prices of essentially every other beverage in Korea has continued to rise, with the exception of soju. If we need a bottle of soju, then KRW200 is a small price to pay.

In the U.S., taxes (and tobacco such as cigarettes) is a called a sin tax.  That is, if you want to drink or smoke, then you are charged for it.  In the U.S. a pack of cigarettes is at least $5.50, or over KRW6000 (and don't ask Manhattanites how much a pack costs).  In Korea, a pack of cigarettes is KRW2500.  A KRW200 tax to fund the NPF is not only justifiable, but it goes to solve an inevitable, long-term problem.

A very important aspect of this proposal is the direct remission of all receipts to the National Pension Fund.  This avoids pointless political wrangling.  Usually, when there are budgetary changes, there is a lot of wasteful, politically-driven debate about where the funds would be used.  A direct deposit to the NPF would avoid all of that.  Politicians that object would be easily identifiable to be those against a proposal that would unequivocally help Korea in the long run.  In other words, if Koreans wanted to know who to vote out of office, this could easily be determined.  While identifying selfish politicians is not the main objective of this proposal, it would be a welcome, needed side effect.   

Things Change, and Korea Must Adjust

The demographic dynamics can change, but the benefits of a tax on every bottle of soju would remain.  The birthrate of Korea could increase.  Koreans may stop drinking (doubtful).  A higher corporate tax rate might result in massive over-funding off the NPF.  The Lost Seoul highly doubts that any of these will occur.  It is potentially the case that a tax on every bottle of soju sold will result in a great deal of revenue to be remitted to the NPF.  That would only result in positive side effects.  For example, if there were a large surplus, then the NPF could increase disbursements to aid aimed at the poor and homeless.  It could invest in infrastructure projects to reduce Korea's dependence on foreign sources of energy.  The elephant in the room is the need to plan for a much, much larger, non tax-paying population, if North and South Korea were suddenly united once again.  In short, a 200KRW tax on every bottle of soju would help solve inevitable long-term issues, and potentially help if certain, sudden events occurred in the short run.

The concept of a "sin tax" is common, and in this case, Korea can learn from other nations.  There are other examples where Korea can follow positive examples to upgrade its practices and laws.  For example, the Seoul Gyopo Guide will begin, in 2011, a new series to focus on Korea's backwardness with respect to international Family Law, as evidenced by Korea's non-participation in the Hague Convention on International Child Abduction.  As Korea's economy advances well into the world's highest echelon, its social and legal structure must meet the responsibilities that accompany that progress.

Hey, Nikki here.  So the fridge countdown says 3 days to move (out of our current home) and 15 days until we board the plane to Korea. Our home is filled with stacks of boxes, open and overflowing suitcases, garbage bags, and random piles of clutter. It doesn't feel like home anymore. The fridge and cupboards are empty and we have resorted to takeout and daily trips to Bilo for small shopping orders. This may sound bad to you, but I couldn't be happier. Each box packed, each bag filled, each takeout box, and each passing day gets me closer to South Korea and the start of what will surely be the greatest adventure of my life thus far! All of the packing, travel to New York, and current affairs are part of the journey too, as I must keep reminding myself.
Today i found out that it is very difficult to pack for 13 months. Stupidly, i thought that it wouldn't be all that difficult. I started with my large suitcase and lined the bottom with about 7 pair of shoes to begin. As I began to layer in my clothing, I realized that several pair of shoes would have to go. My shoes had a showdown and flat, comfy, practical shoes won over dressy sandals and high heeled shoes. After trial and error, I found that folding is definitely more space efficient than rolling (personal opinion). I may have to ditch a sweater or pair of shorts as I begin to add in the heaps of toiletries in coming days, but overall I feel pretty good about my job thus far!
We had another "goodbye" today with a good friend and her precious baby girl. Goodbyes are getting easier with each one that passes. This is not to say that any one friend is more meaningful than another. I think it is to say that I am beginning to be okay with the idea of thinking of goodbye as "I will go and come" instead (thanks to my mother in law : ). I do however fear the exchange that will take place as I begin to see our families for the last time before we depart. This will not, I predict, be easy. This is why, in fact, we have chosen good friends, rather than family to take us to the airport for our departure on the 19th....in 15 days!

Lee Byung-Chul argues that Beijing has a lot more to do with North Korea’s “peaceful” overtures to South Korea than previously thought.

One of the lessons of this episode is that despite professions of inability to control its client state, China appears now to have demonstrated unrivaled leverage on the North in terms of economic, political and military intervention. In addition to supplying substantial amounts of aid including 90 percent of the North’s oil at sharply lower “friendly prices,” China has co-opted and trained a pro-Chinese cadre of North Korean functionaries and elites in the hopes that they would become collaborators under the coming regime of Kim Jong-un, Kim Jong-il’s son and presumptive heir. So Beijing is no longer hiding its solid hold over the North.

There is a certain amount of evidence of distrust of China on the part of the North as well, with the Jan. 3 disclosure of a US diplomatic cable by WikiLeaks, in which Hyun Jeong-eun, the chairwoman of Hyundai Group, returned from the North after a 2009 meeting with Kim. In the cable, Kathleen Stephens, the U.S. ambassador to South Korea, reported on a breakfast with Hyun in which she said that Kim Jong-Il was disappointed after the North’s second nuclear test in May 2009, when China did not object to a UN Security Council resolution condemning the communist country for the test. China’s foreign ministry also issued a statement expressing opposition to the test.

China appears to believe that in the case of a contingency plan for the collapse of the north’s government, it could thus recruit North Korean military men, using them to virtually rule the Kim regime and its population faster than the US could move into place to support the South to take over. The Chinese leadership correctly judges that South Korea would find it difficult to synchronize with the US. Nor, it is thought, would Japan be much help.

Lee also has a sweeping, revisionist view of sunshine policy politics in South Korea that’s interesting to read.

Much of the north’s heightened provocations over the last year may well have stemmed from a misconception on the part of Kim Jong-il over the death of the so-called Sunshine Policy initiated by two previous presidents, Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun. That period was the most exciting moment of the inter-Korean relationship, though South Korea’s conservatives have called it the ‘lost decade.’ North Korea was economically remote but was ideologically closer than it had ever been, essentially because of the sunshine engagement policy.

These deliberate and thoughtful presidents believed the landmark policy would benefit not just the liberals in Seoul but mankind at large. Thus, they believed strongly that the broken regime had the ability to stand alone only if South Koreans could heal the scars through economic assistance.

Soon, however, the proponents of the engagement policy started to notice that once again they were minorities in the South’s mainstream political and economic culture. The conservatives attacked the progressives with a viciousness that took their breath away, calling them ‘sticky slime.’ They were deeply angry at liberals’ goal of national reconciliation, insisting that the language of the sunshine policy was not based on the reality of a bellicose North. In the 2007 presidential elections, South Korea returned to its traditional conservative stance, which certainly must have puzzled the Kim Jong-il regime.

Indeed, the progressives should have realized that there was an expiry date. The sunshine policy expired earlier than they expected, but Kim Jong-il himself appears to have thought the policy which had helped to sustain the hopeless regime, was continuing, without knowing that most South Koreans no longer had any interest in the poor neighbor to the North.

North Korea’s continuing provocations were taken as prima facie evidence that there was something wrong with the engagement policy. The much-debated policy now serves as an unwanted baby for the right-wing Lee government, which is innately sceptical of the progress of any inter-Korean relationship.

The tragedy of the dynastic Kims is that they spent the sunshine days in relative -– for a poverty-stricken regime– glory and affluence but are now going through the hard times of ‘strategic patience’ adopted by Washington and Seoul authorities. They never dreamed that the Lee government would reverse the existing inter-Korean relationship in the name of demanding the denuclearization North Korea. Their predictions were wrong.

If this is true, then, the 2011 Joint Editorial reads more like the confused scribblings of a split personality torn between nostalgia for the sunshine policy years and anger over the South Korean conservatives’ triumph over the progressives.

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Filed under: East Asia, Korea Tagged: china, dprk, kim jong il, kim jong un, lee myung bak, north korea, prc, roh moo hyun, South Korea, wikileaks

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For a change, I think I’ll let this one speak for itself.

But if you would like some context though, then see here. And in fairness (no pun intended), apparently model Lee Soo-hyuk (이수혁) on the right always looks like that.

But still, is such a deathly pallor really something to be aspired to?

(For all posts in the Korean Sociological Images series, see here)

Filed under: Body Image, Cosmetics, Korean Sociological Images, Skin Whitening Tagged: 화이트닝, 화이트닝 셀러브레이션 파티, 화장품, 이수영, Lee Soo-hyuk, SK-II