Now that Kim Jong-il has returned from the PRC’s northeastern provinces, and former US President, Jimmy Carter has negotiated for the release of Aijalon Mahli Gomes, what is clear is, that the DPRK doesn’t want to denuclearize, even if it might return to Six-Party Talks. (Japan has already scotched that weak shoot.) Nightwatch has the best description pf Kim’s hastily-arranged trip to China.

All in all, the visit looks like a Confucian farewell, performing last rites for unfinished family business.

It’s true the itinerary looks like a homage to the revolutionary struggle against Japan, but Kim also took prominent members of the party with him, including Jang Song-taek. Whether or not, Kim left town to avoid Carter is an open question. But, President Hu used the trip to sell a closer relationship between the northeastern provinces and the DPRK.

What Victor Cha, though, views as a positive aspect of the trip, the Hankyoreh mourns. The line in alliances seemingly runs through the DMZ, with China and the DPRK seeking closer economic ties, something the Hankyoreh views as a missed opportunity.

As we see in the confrontation between the United States and China following the sinking of the Cheonan, it is a structure in which North Korea and South Korea could easily become the biggest victims. To change this situation, we must first improve the inter-Korean relations. Moreover, only through a positive state of inter-Korean relations can a complete solution to the nuclear issue and discussions about a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia become possible.

The tightening relations between North Korea and China is also the product of the hardline policies implemented by South Korea and the United States. Now the burden on South Korea’s shoulders has grown heavier. To stabilize the situation on the Korean Peninsula and resolve the nuclear issue, our government must change.

Victor Cha emphasizes the end of celebrity diplomacy.

Carter’s mission also has one very important implication for future negotiations. The North Koreans have made good use of high-level unofficial contacts to try to make agreements and trumpet public statements to put pressure on the official negotiations. Kim Jong-il met with the chairwoman of Hyundai last year, for example, and released a detained South Korean worker to try to pressure the Lee government. They have used individuals like Selig Harrison and Bill Richardson for this purpose as well.

But Carter’s trip and the one by former president Clinton last year to retrieve the two American journalists should have made it eminently clear to Pyongyang that there is now no alternative to talking directly with the Obama administration. Both Clinton and Carter stuck strictly to their scripts of bringing detained Americans home and did not engage in any other discussions besides urging the North to fulfill their denuclearization pledges. This was perhaps Carter’s most important contribution to future negotiations, even though he did not engage in any himself.

Seoul could very well be the loser. But, it might also gain from the stability netted from closer China-DPRK ties. Seoul should realize it won’t just get the labor-rich exploitation zone it wants up north, and might just have to pursue economic reforms to squeeze more mileage out of its economy. And, short of a coup or unforeseen event in the DPRK, unification is a fantasy. Kim Jong-il might have arranged it on the fly, but he bested the Lee administration.

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Filed under: East Asia, Korea, USA, WMD Tagged: aijalon gomes, china, denuclearization, dprk, hu jintao, jimmy carter, kim jong il, lee myung -nak, prc, rok